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Introduction
Public support for social spending and redistribution are an important constituent of the le-
gitimacy of mature welfare states, who – despite of being in a state of “permanent austerity”
(Pierson 2001) – have only implemented rather modest cut-backs (Kuhnle 2000; Huber and
Stephens 2001; Swank 2002, 2005). With those sustained levels of provision, someone clearly
has to “foot the bill” (Taylor-Gooby 2001).
Who supports those redistributive arrangements and who does not? This question falls squarely
in the domain of political sociology which concerns itself with the link between social and
political life (Svallfors 2007: 1). An extensive literature has developed explanations based on
individual’s socio-structural position and institutional feedback effects (see Hasenfeld and Raf-
ferty 1989; Svallfors 1993; Papadakis and Bean 1993; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Evans 1996;
Svallfors 1997, 1999, 2002, 2003; Gelissen 2000; Andreß and Heien 2001; Blekesaune and
Quadagno 2003; Linos and West 2003; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Mehrtens III 2004;
Rudolph and Jillian 2005; Edlund 2006; Meier-Jaeger 2006, 2008, 2009; Blekesaune 2007).
However, so far the role of religion as determinant of individual preferences for redistribution
has not been the central focus of previous research.
In this paper, we analyze this link between religion and preferences in a comparative perspec-
tive in order to answer the following research questions: Do religious individuals differ from
their secular counterparts in their support for redistribution? If so, is the effect relevant in
size compared to established factors? Is the antagonism between religious and non-religious
citizens in modern West European countries (quantitatively) more important than the old
Catholic-Protestant divide?
The results of this paper contribute to a growing literature that broadly links religion and atti-
tudes towards the welfare state. Recent examples include van Oorschot (2010) who examines
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people’s beliefs about moral and economic consequences of welfare policy in the Netherlands
and includes religion next to structural location and personal experiences. Religion is also
considered in van Oorschot’s (2006) study of citizen’s perceptions of deservingness of welfare
recipients. Similarly, van Oorschot et al. (2005) consider religion in a model of individual’s
concerns with various recipients of welfare. Generally, the results of those papers indicate that
religion is not an important factor for explaining citizen’s beliefs about deservingness and the
welfare state’s moral and economic consequences. Starting from a political economy perspec-
tive Scheve and Stasavage (2006) and Chen and Lind (2006) look at religion as a substitute
for state-provided insurance and find that religiosity decreases an individual’s demand for wel-
fare state spending. Besides those micro-level analyses, scholars using a macro-comparative
perspective note the impact of religion on the behavior and strategies of elites during the for-
mative years of Western welfare states (e.g. Castles 1994a, b; Manow and Kersbergen 2008)
as well as the distinct impact of Catholic and Protestant traditions on timing and generosity
of modern welfare policies (Manow 2002; Kahl 2005; Hicks 2006).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline the theoretical argument
linking religion and redistribution preferences. From this we derive four testable hypotheses
in section 3. We then describe the construction of our country level variables in section 4. This
section also describes the individual level data set, the cumulated European Social Survey
from 2002 to 2006. Section 5 presents the multilevel model used and provides details of
its estimation. We present estimation results in Section 6 and calculate further quantities of
interest to obtain strict hypothesis tests. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
Religion as persistent cleavage
Contemporary political sociologists usually emphasize the role of social class and other struc-
tural factors when trying to explain individual attitudes towards redistribution. For exam-
ple, in his excellent introduction to the “political sociology of the welfare state”, Svallfors
(2007) outlines some ‘new’ cleavages (age and gender) in addition to the traditional worker–
owner/manager antagonism, but there is no mention of religion as a ‘classical’ dividing line
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This is not surprising given the predominant (academic) view that
in enlightened and secular societies religion plays a minor role in people’s everyday lives. It
is seen as a relict of the past, invoked on wedding days and Christmas, but with no further
impact on (political) attitudes and beliefs. In political-sociological research, this preconcep-
tion is reflected by the rather scant attention that has been paid to religious as opposed to
class cleavages. Recently, researchers have begun to pay renewed attention to the religious
cleavage (e.g. Manza and Brooks 1997; De Graaf et al. 2001; Brooks et al. 2006; Elff 2007).
The process of secularization does not necessarily lead to a decline in the effect of religion on
individuals. In a secularizing environment, religion can gain prominence in the political pro-
cess, when its position on social and moral issues is juxtaposed against secular proposals, that
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are depicted as leading to the decline of a society’s moral order (Madeley 1991).2 As Inglehart
observes, individuals who oppose the majority’s values, are “galvanized into unusually active
and disruptive forms of behavior, in order to defend their threatened values” (Inglehart 1997:
281). Especially in Western countries, characterized by far progressed secularization, individ-
uals “who retain their religious identity may oppose other aspects of secularization processes,
showing increasing political differences in comparison to non-religious voters” (Brooks et al.
2006: 93, our emphasis). These lines of conflict start to become visible to such an extent
that some researchers speak of a “good gap” in political behavior (Olson and Green 2006).
Therefore, rather than leading to a decline in the importance of religion per se, secularization
shifts the basis of the religious cleavage from the antagonism between Catholic and Protes-
tant denominations to the distinction between secular and religious individuals (Wuthnow
1988). These shifts gradually make religion, rather than class, the most important cleavage in
modern societies. As Martin Elff concludes in his study of cleavages and voting in European
democracies:
“Reports of the death of social cleavages are exaggerated. While the consequences
of class positions seem to have weakened in some of the countries, the conse-
quences of the division between religious and secular people have not” (Elff 2007:
289).
In the light of these findings, we employ the notion of religious cleavage beyond research on
voting behavior. Using a broader definition of cleavage as “borders between social categories”
which generate the potential of social conflict (Svallfors 2007: 9), we investigate effects of
individual’s cleavage position on redistribution attitudes. The mechanism linking cleavage
position and preferences is a process of identification: Individuals who identify with a religious
group in a society will adjust their norms and preferences to be similar to the ones dominant
in that group (for an extensive treatment see Shayo 2009). This, of course, raises the question
of what religion’s position towards state redistribution is and how it came about.
On first thought, one might expect religious individuals to be supportive of redistribution.
After all, religious individuals are known to donate time and money to help the less fortunate
(for an overview see Wiepking and Bekkers 2009). However, the religious cleavage perspec-
tive stresses the long history of the church–state conflict over the provision of welfare. This
antagonism is the result of critical junctures in the history of church and state. The Catholic
church has always been opposed to the state’s intervention in social policy matters. According
to the principle of subsidiarity, it preferred local solutions provided by church organizations
(Kahl 2005: 98-101). In contrast, the Protestant church and the state had a symbiotic rela-
tionship during the reformation period. The Protestant church was able to use those ties to
the state to enforce its views of strict social policies necessary to maintain social order (Kahl
2005, Rossteutscher 2009: 127 ff.). But this relationship was destroyed during the construc-
tion of the modern nation state, where conflicts over moral authority and material resources
were decided in favor of the state (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 50). From welfare provision to
2Whereas classical sociological writers often portray religion as “social glue” of a society, historically, it has at
least to the same extent functioned as source of disagreement and conflict
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the education of children, the state wrested major domains of public life from the churches.
They became one organization among many in the realm of civil society and as a result were
less able to form social policy. This produced a continuously increasing gap between religious
conceptions of welfare and social order and the rules and principles implemented by the sec-
ular state and lead to a “pronounced anti welfare-state position” of (especially Protestant)
churches and parties (Manow 2002:206, our translation).
Hence we argue that contemporary religious individuals oppose redistributive welfare polices.
Whilst not necessarily opposed to the general idea of ameliorating the inequalities and social
ills generated by markets, they object to the provision of welfare by the secular state. Welfare
state policies are based on the notion of rights (Marshall 1950), ignoring religious or moral
criteria for the provision of welfare. In contrast, providing welfare voluntarily, through dona-
tions or participation in charitable church activities, leaves the form of help and the decision
of who is considered as deserving or not at the (religious) individual’s discretion (cf. de Swaan
1988; Schneider and Ingram 1993; van Oorschot 2000; Deacon 2002).
Religion and redistribution from an economics of religion perspective
While the cleavage approach stresses identification or religious belonging, economics of reli-
gion scholars (Chen and Lind 2006; Scheve and Stasavage 2006) focus on religious behavior.
As a result, they provide a different mechanism to connect individual religiosity and prefer-
ences for redistribution. Following the standard economics of religion approach (e.g. Stark
and Iannaccone 1994), demand for religion is taken as given and what is modeled is how an
individual divides his time between non-church and church activities. Integration into a reli-
gious community helps to insulate individuals against adverse life events (e.g. becoming sick
or unemployed) by providing them with help both in the material (money, unpaid help), as
well as a ‘psychic’ (coping with a difficult life situation) sense (Pergament 1997, 2002; Clark
and Lelkes 2005). From this perspective it is straightforward to conceptualize religiosity and
state welfare spending as substitute goods: regular churchgoers who “privately insure them-
selves via religion” (Scheve and Stasavage 2006: 263) demand less welfare provision by the
state.
Hypotheses
After this more general account of the role of religion in contemporary Western societies, we
derive four testable hypotheses.
Given the persistent importance of religion as a societal cleavage and its formation through
an extensive period of church–state conflict about welfare provision and social order, religious
individuals prefer to ameliorate social ills through their churches and organizations and not
through secular state programs. From this line of reasoning follows the central hypothesis
of this study: Individuals that identify with (any) one of the major Christian religions will be
opposed to income redistribution by the state (H1).
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Previous research on religion and the welfare state stresses differences between denomina-
tions because of the strong link between Catholicism and Christian Democratic parties (e.g.
Esping-Andersen 1990; Kersbergen 1995; Manow 2002; Manow and Kersbergen 2008). This
suggests that Catholics may be less opposed to state redistribution than Protestants (Kahl
2005; van Oorschot 2010: 22). However, the process of secularization renders these dif-
ferences less salient, so that the Protestant–Catholic dichotomy is gradually replaced by the
secular–religious cleavage (Wuthnow 1988; Inglehart 1997; Olson and Green 2006). There-
fore, we expect that differences between religious and secular individuals are larger than dif-
ferences between Catholics and Protestants (H2), thus demonstrating the importance of the
religious–secular divide.
While the previous hypotheses were concerned with an individual’s religious self-identification,
or religious belonging, the economics of religion perspective stresses the importance of religious
practice. According to this view, spending more time participating in organized religious ac-
tivities decreases one’s demand for social protection by the state (Scheve and Stasavage 2006:
267). If this proposed relationship holds, individuals who attend church frequently will show
less support for redistribution (H3).
Religion also exerts an influence on the contextual level. Where religious groups constitute
a strong opponent to the secular part of society, they are more likely to make their opinions
heard. Therefore, each individual is more likely to encounter negative views on the redistribu-
tive role of the state. As a results, we expect that the higher the level of religious polarization
in a country is, the lower its citizen’s support for redistribution will be (H4).
Established explanations
Besides these new hypotheses concerning the role of religion, a number of established ex-
planatory factors, both on the individual and country level, have to be considered (for an
overview see Meier-Jaeger 2006). Higher income, as well as education leads to opposition
to redistribution (Meltzer and Richards 1981; Moene and Wallerstein 2001).3 Contrary, indi-
viduals who face heightened risk of income loss (e.g. the short term employed and families
with children) are expected to be supportive of redistribution. It has been shown that indi-
viduals doing housework full-time, are unemployed, disabled or pensioners – the so called
transfer classes (Alber 1984) – support redistribution as well. Individuals in advantaged class
positions, especially members of the service classes who usually enjoy long-term contracts
and low chances of dismissal will not support redistributive arrangements (Goldthorpe 1995;
Goldthorpe and McKnight 2006). Similarly, individuals who are self-employed are expected to
oppose welfare state intervention in market generated income distributions. Contrary, work-
ers, especially those in routine manual occupations, are expected to have strong preferences
for redistribution (Svallfors 2004). Finally, institutional differences between welfare-states
have been show to influence citizens preferences (Arts and Gelissen 2001). We expect that
3For a more sophisticated position on skills see Iversen and Soskice (2001).
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especially liberal welfare policy patterns will diminish individual support for redistribution
(Hicks and Kenworthy 2003).
Data and Measurement
Individual level data
To analyze the questions posed above, we use the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002-2006
cumulated file which provides data on 79,679 individuals from sixteen West European coun-
tries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Since
countries did not necessarily participate every year, 41 country-years are used in the analyses.
The ESS ensures exceptionally high standards regarding the comparability of questionnaires,
sampling designs and population coverage, making it an ideal tool to analyze a large number
of countries simultaneously. Details on sampling designs, questionnaire translation, fieldwork
and data documentation are available at www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
The ESS probes a respondent’s support for redistribution using a straightforward question:
“please say to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statement: The govern-
ment should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”. Responses are recorded
using a five-point agree–disagree scale. They do not follow a normal distribution, but are
left skewed with the majority of European citizens showing some support for redistribution.
However, as can be seen in Table 1 on the following page, support is not unconditional, as
the differences between the “strongly agree” categories show: variation in the level of strong
support for redistribution ranges from only 10 percent in Denmark – hinting a possible ceiling
effect – to over 43 percent in France.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the individual level variables included in the analyses.
Religious denomination is a nominal variable assigning individuals to one of the following
categories: No denomination, Catholics, Protestants or other.4 The cross-national scope of the
European Social Survey imposes some restrictions here, and finer distinctions between local
religious sects can not be detected in this study. Church attendance is captured using a quasi-
metric variable for the frequency with which our respondents visit church (if at all), ranging
from never to daily attendance.
A respondent’s education is assessed using the years of schooling she has accumulated. Income
is measured on the household level using a twelve-category scale in 500 Euro increments.5
Membership in one of the transfer classes is included as a dummy variable for being unem-
ployed, retired, or not in labor force for a variety of reasons (permanent disability, doing
housework etc.). Two further dichotomous indictors capture what we have labeled economic
risks: being on a temporary, short-term contract and having one or more children living in
4This is a rather heterogeneous group of muslims and Eastern faiths which are too small to include on their own.
5Respondents had the possibility to give weekly, monthly or yearly income figures.
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Table 1: Support for income redistribution in
Western Europe. Means, standard devia-
tions and percentage of respondents placing
themselves in the highest category (“strongly
agree”)
strongly
mean sd agree
Portugal 4.21 0.78 38.7
France 4.09 1.07 43.8
Italy 4.06 0.89 33.9
Spain 4.04 0.87 30.7
Finland 3.97 1.01 34.4
Austria 3.79 1.07 28.0
Ireland 3.76 0.93 18.3
Belgium 3.72 1.08 24.4
Sweden 3.70 0.93 17.0
Norway 3.65 1.00 18.2
Switzerland 3.60 1.06 17.4
Luxembourg 3.60 1.16 22.7
Germany 3.52 1.08 16.9
Great Britain 3.50 1.03 14.0
Netherlands 3.44 1.08 13.9
Denmark 3.02 1.15 9.5
Note: Based on multiply imputed data from ESS
2002-2006. Variable is measured on a five point
ordinal scale.
7
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of individual level vari-
ables (means and standard deviations).
mean sd.
Income 6.91 2.32
Education 12.03 4.21
Age 47.31 18.09
Female 0.53 0.50
Church attendance 2.48 1.51
Denomination
No Religion 0.40 0.49
Catholic 0.36 0.48
Protestant 0.21 0.41
Other 0.03 0.17
Transfer classes
Unemployed 0.04 0.20
Retired 0.24 0.42
Not in Labor Force 0.20 0.40
Economic risk
Temporary contract 0.18 0.39
Children in household 0.37 0.48
Social Class
Higher Salariat 0.09 0.29
Lower Salariat 0.18 0.39
Intermediate occupations 0.09 0.29
Self-employed / small employers 0.08 0.28
Lower supervisory / technicians 0.11 0.31
Lower sales / service / clerical 0.10 0.30
Lower technical 0.08 0.27
Routine 0.15 0.35
Note: Multiply imputed data from ESS 2002–2006
the household. Social class is included by coding detailed occupation-by-employment-status
units into a categorical class scheme. More precisely, we use the European Socio-economic
Classification which provides a harmonized and validated adaptation of the widely used EGP
(Erikson et al. 1979) class scheme (see Rose and Harrison 2010).
Dealing with missing information: multiple imputation
Missing data is an ubiquitous feature of surveys (Groves et al. 2001). Even when extra pre-
cautions are taken to ensure maximal response rates (for a discussion about the ESS see Stoop
2005: ch. 10), item non-response remains a concern. While the percentage of missing item re-
sponses is generally reasonably low for the variables used in this study (between one and two
percent), 22.3 percent of all respondents refused to provide information about their income.
It is not possible to ignore this missing data, given that income is related strongly to redistribu-
tion preferences according to classic political economy theories (Meltzer and Richards 1981).
The default approach for dealing with missing cases is listwise deletion – i.e. excluding all
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individuals with missing data on one of the model variables. However, this strategy leads to
seriously biased estimates when the mechanism that produces missingness is not completely
random (Allison 2001; King et al. 2001; Little and Rubin 2002: ch. 1). This problem has been
ignored by previous studies.6
An appropriate solution is to use a multiple imputation approach (Rubin 1996). Values for
the missing cells are generated according to a probabilistic mechanism and several (m ≥ 2)
imputed data sets are created. The final quantities of interest are obtained by combining es-
timates from each of the m individual datasets (Rubin 1987). This reflects the uncertainty
introduced by the imputation procedure and leads to adequate (conservative) estimates of
standard errors.7 We use multiple imputations based on chained regression equations (Raghu-
nathan et al. 2001; Buuren et al. 2006; Buuren 2007), where imputations are carried out
sequentially for each single variable. Missing values are replaced with predictions from re-
gression models appropriate for the measurement level of each variable. Iteratively repeating
this process realizes a Gibbs sampling scheme, which, when convergence of parameter val-
ues is achieved, gives results analogous to draws from a multivariate distribution (Abayomi
et al. 2008: 279). We apply this approach to the pooled ESS data (stratified by country)
using further available individual characteristics in the imputation model, which leads to an
increase in the precision of the imputations.8 After ensuring that the chains have converged to
their steady state using the Gelman-Rubin diagnostic9 and checking that sensible values were
imputed using graphical displays as suggested by Abayomi et al. (2008), we generate three
imputed data sets which constitute the basis of subsequent analyses and descriptive statistics
presented in this paper.
Religious polarization
To model the importance of religion as a societal dividing line, we need a measure that ac-
counts not only for the size of religious and secular groups, but also for the distance between
them. In a classic paper, Esteban and Ray (1994) provide a sophisticated account of how to
construct a measure of polarization using group size and group distance. Finding a distance
measure is not easy, which is why it is often left out of widely used polarization and frac-
tionalization indices (e.g Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2002, 2005a, b; Alesina et al. 2003).
6A notable exception is the replication study by Linos and West (2003).
7A widely used approach to get imputation values is to consider the data as coming from a multivariate normal
distribution from which values are drawn. Imputations for variables which are clearly not normal – gender
being the prime example – are rounded to sensible values afterwards (see for example King et al’s (2001)
Amelia routine). Since the majority of this study’s variables are categorical – including the dependent one –
this procedure is questionable and is not used here.
8This constitutes an additional advantage of multiple imputation over ad-hoc methods, since we can obtain
imputations based on more information than used in the analysis model – yielding so called “superefficient”
imputations (Rubin 1996). Variables used are: discretion to organize tasks at work, prior unemployment,
living in a rural area and household size.
9Since multiple imputation using chained equations generates several (in our case three) sampled chains, one
can use Gelman and Rubin’s diagnostic based on multiple sequences here (Gelman and Rubin 1992).
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However, using distances is essential to the definition of polarization: holding the size of op-
posing groups constant, an increase in distance between those groups is hypothesized to to
lead to higher conflict potential (Duclos et al. 2004; Permanyer 2008). Using an ESS question
which asks all individuals about their subjective assessment of their strength of religiosity, I
create average distances between those belonging to a denomination and those who do not
(for a similar approach using World Value Survey data, see Permanyer 2008).10 Building on
Esteban and Ray (1994) I model polarization, P, between religious and secular groups as a
function of group size and distance:
P(pi, y) = pirpis abs(yr − ys).
Group size is captured in the first half of the equation, where pir and pis denote the popula-
tion share of the religious and secular group, respectively. The second half of the equation
adds distance, or alienation (Esteban and Ray 1994: 831), between groups by including the
absolute distance in religiosity, y , between the religious and secular.11
Table 3 on the next page shows for each country the size of the religious group and its dis-
tance in religiosity to the secular group. It reveals clear country differences: religious–secular
distance is high in Germany, Belgium and Spain, whereas it is rather low in the Scandinavian
countries. The resulting measure of religious polarization is given in the last column. We see
rather large values in countries like Germany, France, or Belgium, where the religious group
constitutes about half of the population and where the religious distance between both groups
is large. The correlation of our polarization measure with the widely used fractionalization
index of Alesina et al. (2003), which ignores the distance between religious and secular indi-
viduals, is 0.57.12
Welfare state characteristics
A study on redistribution preferences would not be complete without taking welfare state
policies and structures into account. A straightforward approach is to include dummy vari-
ables representing three (or more) of Esping Andersen’s (1990) famous regime types (pre-
vious large-N studies using this approach include Gelissen 2000; Arts and Gelissen 2001;
Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Svallfors 2003).13 However, treating regimes as monolithic
blocks might obscure important differences between countries. After all, Esping-Andersen’s
10The exact question wording is “Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would
you say you are?”. Responses are recorded on a 10 point scale ranging from “not at all religious” to “very
religious”.
11Most of the theoretical derivations of the polarization measure are done with respect to income polarization.
However, there is nothing in the assumptions of these measures that would preclude their application to other
forms of “social polarization” (Duclos et al. 2004).
12However, one should note that even when using this simpler fractionalization measure, our substantive results
do not change.
13Studies concentrating on a small number of countries usually select countries taken as ‘typical’ manifestations
of welfare regimes, e.g. Svallfors 1993, 1999, 2002; Bean and Papadakis 1998; Linos and West 2003
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Table 3: Size of religious group, religious distance and polarization in
Western European countries.
Size of Mean Religious
Religious Group Religious Distance Polarization
Austria 0.68 3.01 0.65
Belgium 0.44 3.40 0.84
Denmark 0.60 2.28 0.55
Finland 0.69 1.61 0.34
France 0.46 3.46 0.86
Germany 0.53 3.84 0.95
Great Britain 0.47 3.19 0.79
Ireland 0.83 2.55 0.37
Italy 0.79 3.26 0.54
Luxembourg 0.71 2.61 0.54
Netherlands 0.42 3.29 0.80
Norway 0.50 2.02 0.51
Portugal 0.85 3.64 0.46
Spain 0.73 3.56 0.71
Sweden 0.30 2.53 0.53
Switzerland 0.66 2.14 0.48
Note: Size of religious group and religious distance calculated from multiply
imputed data from ESS 2002–2006
regimes are a theoretical ideal-type and existing countries do not map easily onto them, as
demonstrated by a recent research project by Lyle Scruggs (see Scruggs 2006; Scruggs and
Allan 2006, 2008).
A more promising route is to use a range of empirical indicators of welfare state character-
istics (e.g. Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Blekesaune 2007; Meier-Jaeger 2009) to map
countries in a low-dimensional ‘welfare-state space’. We use eight indicators to capture dif-
ferences in economic and social policies (descriptive statistics are given in Table 4 on the
following page). An indicator of overall welfare effort is the level of social expenditure: the
proportion of a country’s GDP that is spent on social services, cash and in-kind benefits (OECD
2008b). Disadvantages of this widely used measure include its (a) very general nature and
(b) dependence on the level of economic performance of a country. To capture more nu-
anced differences in welfare state generosity, we use unemployment benefits (OECD 2004a)
and pension payments (OECD 2005) calculated as replacement rates of the income of an av-
erage production worker. A defining feature of conservative social policy is its concentration
on work-related policies, protecting the labor market status of the (male) breadwinner, who
supports his family. The OECD’s index of employment protection legislation provides a measure
of the extent to which legislation is passed that is favorable to labor market insiders, protect-
ing them from individual or collective dismissal or short-term employment contracts (OECD
2004b, data for Luxembourg are from OECD 2006: ch. 3). A country’s level of inequality is
measured using the Gini coefficient (available for the mid nineties) calculated from detailed
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of macro level variables
(means and standard deviations).
mean sd
Welfare state characteristics
Social expenditure (in % GDP) 23.86 3.61
Unemployment benefits (repl. rate) 0.61 0.19
Pensions payments (repl. rate) 0.73 0.18
Employment protection legislation 2.34 0.66
Parental leave (in FTE weeks) 16.86 17.40
Accumulated left seats (since 1960) 16.41 7.80
Economic Integration 3.56 0.97
Inequality (GINI index) 0.29 0.04
Note: For sources, see text.
micro-data obtained in the Luxembourg Income Study and compiled by the OECD (2009).
The percentage of seats accumulated by left parties since 1960 is calculated from Armingeon
et al. (2008) and captures their distinct influence on welfare state policies, especially in Scan-
dinavian countries. Siaroff’s scoring of the level of economic integration captures the extent
to which tripartite negotiations between employer and employee organizations and the state
are used to solve industrial conflicts and to coordinate macroeconomic policy (Siaroff 1999).
Finally, as a proxy for the extent to which welfare states differ in their family policies (see
Orloff 1993; Esping-Andersen 1999), we use the length of the parental leave period following
the birth of a child calculated as full-time-wage equivalent weeks to harmonize the rather
different replacement rates between countries (OECD 2008a).
In line with previous welfare-state research, those variables are highly correlated, hinting
that they are generated by a small number of underlying factors. Research by Hicks and
Kenworthy (2003) has shown that Esping-Andersen’s (1990) three dimensions of social pol-
icy – social-democratic, liberal, conservative – can be reduced to a two dimensional welfare
space, since liberal and social-democratic policies are “opposing poles of a single dimension”
(Hicks and Kenworthy 2003: 32). Following their argument, we estimate a two-dimensional
Bayesian confirmatory factor model (Congdon 2006: ch. 12; Lee 2007), which is displayed
in Table 5.14 This indeed reveals a rather clear structure of loadings, similar in substance
to the one found by Hicks and Kenworthy, with dimension one contrasting social-democratic
versus liberal policies and dimension two capturing the extent to which welfare states posses
14More precisely, we estimate the following specification: x i = Λφi + εi , εi ∼ N(0,Ψ), where x i is a vector
of individual responses, Λ is a 8 x 2 matrix of factor loadings, φi contains countries’ scores on the latent
variables and εi is an error term which is normally distributed over countries. The model is identified by fixing
one item for each factor; social expenditure on factor one and employment protection legislation on factor
two. Using independent normal priors for scores and loadings and inverse gamma priors for elements of Ψ
completes the Bayesian specification of this model. We estimate the model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(via Gibbs sampling) which provides a straightforward assessment of the importance (or ‘significance’) of the
factor loadings by inspecting their empirical 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles.
12
Table 5: Results from two-dimensional factor analysis of welfare
state characteristics. Loadings and uniqueness.
Dim. 1 Dim. 2 Unique.
Social expenditure 1.00 ns 0.50
Unemployment benefits 0.86 ns 0.37
Economic integration 0.88 ns 0.45
Accumulated left seats 0.85 ns 0.47
Parental leave 0.96 ns 0.36
Inequality (Gini index) −0.97 ns 0.28
Employment protection legislation ns 1.00 0.04
Pensions payments ns 0.74 0.48
Note: Non-significant loadings are denoted by ns. Based on 40.000 MCMC
draws obtained via Gibbs sampling. Correlation between both dimen-
sions is 0.02.
features of conservative social policy.15
The distribution of countries in this two dimensional space is displayed in Figure 1 on the
next page which shows scores for each country. We see the usual arrangement of countries
along the predominant liberal–social-democratic dimension and a separate group of highly
conservative countries. Furthermore, the distribution of countries emphasizes that putting
them into mutually exclusive regime groups obscures some important policy differences. For
example, while Great Britain and Ireland, two countries of the ‘liberal group’, are indeed close
to each other; Sweden and Norway, generally classified as genuinely social-democratic, occupy
quite distinct positions regarding the extent to which liberal policy elements are present.
Analytical strategy
This combined macro-micro data set is analyzed using the following parametric specification,
where c denotes the response category chosen by individual i in country-year j, x i jp denotes p
individual level covariates and associated effect parameters βp, where some of them may vary
across country-years (yielding so called ‘random slopes’) with associated effect parameters
βr j . Finally u jq represents q country level variables and their effect parameters γq:
15A one-dimensional factor model strongly suggests that pensions and employment protection legislation belong
on a separate dimension. A model with three factors yields only insignificant loadings on the third factor.
13
−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
−
1.
5
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lAT
BE
CH
DE
DK
ES
FI
FR
GB
IE
IT
LU
NL
NO
PT
SE
Liberal vs. social−democratic policies
Ex
te
nt
 o
f c
on
se
rv
a
tiv
e
 p
ol
ici
es
Figure 1: Country positions in two dimensional welfare-policy space (scores from two-dimensional
factor model)
logit[Pr(yi ≤ c)] = τc j +
P∑
p=1
βp x i jp +
R∑
r=1
βr j x i jr
τc j ∼ N(γ0 +
Q∑
q=1
γqu jq,σ
2
τ)
βr j ∼ MV N(0,σ2βr )
The cut-points τ are constrained to be monotonically decreasing and identical for all covari-
ates, leading to the well-known ordered logit model with proportional odds (McCullagh 1980;
Agresti 2002). To capture unobserved differences in response behavior of individuals from dif-
ferent countries, the cut-points are free to vary across countries (cf. Molenberghs and Verbeke
2005: ch. 18) by giving them a normal distribution, with the mean influenced by country
level variables and freely estimated variance σ2τ (see Sun et al. 2000; Congdon 2005; Gill
2008).
We estimate the model in a Bayesian framework (see Lynch 2007 for introduction), using non-
informative independent normal priors for the regression coefficients p and q with mean zero
and variance 1000. For the multivariate group-level parameters (see model 3 of Table 6) –
intercept α and R random slopes – we use an inverse Wishart prior with 4 degrees of freedom
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and scale matrix I∗0.005 (c.f. Gelman et al. 2004).16 Models are estimated using a Metropolis-
Hastings sampler run for 220,000 iterations, with the first 20,000 iterations discarded as burn-
in. Chains were thinned by a factor of ten to yield 20,000 samples on which the following
inferences are based.17
Table 6 shows posterior means and standard deviations from three estimated models of in-
creasing complexity. After controlling for micro-level composition effects the intra-class cor-
relation of Model 1 is estimates as 0.071 with a 95% confidence bound ranging from 0.053 to
0.092.18 This indicates that significant country differences exist: seven percent of the overall
variance is due to country characteristics. Including our three central macro-level predictors
reduces this measure to 0.046, while providing a better fit as indicated by the BIC difference
(Raftery 1995). Model 3 realizes a more complex specification where denomination effects are
allowed to vary over countries (‘random slopes’). The historical developments of church–state
conflict, as well as modernization processes more generally, vary between Western European
countries, and this model allows for unobserved effects of historical and cultural peculiarities
– providing a stricter test of our hypotheses.
Results and Discussion
Looking first at the estimated effects of religion in model 1, Table 6 on the following page,
we see our first hypothesis confirmed: Catholics and Protestants both strongly oppose re-
distribution at a level comparable to that of five more years of education or an increase in
net household income of 500 Euro. The effect of church attendance is an order of magnitude
smaller, but highly statistically relevant, confirming hypothesis 3. However, to obtain the same
effect strength as denomination, an individual would have to increase his or her frequency of
church attendance from showing up only on holidays to attending services several times a
week. The estimated effects of religion remain stable when we include country characteristics
in model 2. In our final model we allow the effect of religious denomination to vary over
countries, in order to capture unobserved country differences in the role of religion. Here,
differences between both denominations are discernible. While the effect for Protestants re-
mains virtually the same, the estimate for Catholics becomes smaller. This is a result of the
larger variance of the Catholic effect over countries. It is more than three times larger than
the variance for the Protestant slope (see Country level variances in model 3). However, the
variances of both denomination slopes are rather small compared to the differences between
countries, captured by the variance of the intercept.
In light of these results, what can we say about hypothesis 2? Using the results from model
3, we calculate the difference between the effects of being a Catholic or a Protestant (and its
16If only a random intercept is modeled (models 1 and 2 of Table 6), I use a uniform prior between 0 and 100 on
its standard deviation.
17Several tests are used to diagnose the absence of convergence (c.f. Brooks and Roberts 1998). Furthermore,
using priors with even larger variances did not change results.
18Intra-class correlation is calculated as 0.251/(0.251 + pi2/3). In the Bayesian framework, we can get a 95%
confidence bound for the ICC from the MCMC output.
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Table 6: Results from hierarchical ordered logit models. Estimates (posterior means) and standard
errors (posterior standard deviations).
M1 M2 M3
est s.e. est s.e. est s.e.
Denomination (ref: none)
Catholic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.117 0.024 −0.122 0.021 −0.089 0.042
Protestant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.141 0.025 −0.137 0.020 −0.122 0.030
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.098 0.045 −0.100 0.045 −0.071 0.055
Church attendance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.025 0.006 −0.025 0.006 −0.024 0.006
Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.101 0.005 −0.101 0.005 −0.099 0.005
Education/5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.101 0.012 −0.100 0.012 −0.101 0.012
Age/10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.039 0.005 0.039 0.005 0.039 0.005
Female . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.261 0.015 0.261 0.015 0.262 0.015
Transfer classes (ref: working)
Unemployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.277 0.035 0.278 0.036 0.266 0.035
Retired . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.015 0.023 −0.015 0.023 −0.014 0.023
Not in labor force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.103 0.020 −0.103 0.020 −0.101 0.020
Economic risk
Temporary contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.007 0.019 −0.007 0.019 −0.008 0.019
Children in household . . . . . . . . . . 0.086 0.015 0.086 0.015 0.084 0.015
Social Class (ref: lower salariat)
Higher Salariat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.409 0.027 −0.410 0.027 −0.408 0.027
Intermediate occupations . . . . . . . 0.007 0.028 0.008 0.028 0.010 0.028
Self-employed / small employers −0.155 0.029 −0.154 0.029 −0.154 0.029
Lower supervisory / technicians 0.168 0.027 0.168 0.027 0.169 0.027
Lower sales / service / clerical . . 0.148 0.028 0.149 0.027 0.149 0.027
Lower technical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.279 0.031 0.280 0.030 0.279 0.030
Routine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.266 0.027 0.268 0.027 0.267 0.027
No class allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.029 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028
Country characteristics
Social-democratic–Liberal Dim. . −0.181 0.083 −0.219 0.074
Conservative Dimension 0.273 0.073 0.220 0.064
Religious polarization . . . . . . . . . . . −0.749 0.347 −0.669 0.305
Country level variances
Intercept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.251 0.063 0.159 0.040 0.162 0.040
Catholic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.049 0.015
Protestant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.014 0.006
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.013 0.011
Sampled log-likelihood −103758 −103698 −103609
BIC 212063 207723 207647
BIC diff. to previous model 4254 86 76
Note: Estimated category intercepts are omitted to save space. BIC difference for M1 refers to comparison to a
variance component model with no predictors. Multiply imputed data from ESS 2002–2006. Effective sample
size is 79,679. Imputations combined according to Rubin 1987. Based on 20.000 MCMC draws.
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Figure 2: Effect difference between Catholics and Protestants and effect difference between Religious
and Secular Individuals. Differences and associated 95% confidence bounds
associated standard error), as well as the difference between religious individuals and secular
individuals. If hypothesis 2 is correct, we expect to see larger differences between the latter.19
Figure 2 shows that the difference (or cleavage) between religious and secular individuals is
much larger than the old division between Catholics and Protestants. The latter is so small
that is is statistically indistinguishable from zero. While simple eyeballing makes this result
apparent, a more formal test is to examine the difference between those two differences
(since the difference between a significant and non-significant effect is not necessarily itself
significant, as elaborated by Gelman and Stern 2006). The Bayesian approach allows for an
easy calculation of this difference and its uncertainty from the generated MCMC samples. This
yields a difference of 0.139 with a standard error of 0.025, thus lending clear support to our
second hypothesis.
Our findings for the contextual effect of religion confirm hypothesis 4. The degree of re-
ligious polarization exerts a negative effect on citizen’s preferences for redistribution, even
after taking welfare-state differences into account. To better visualize the effect of these coun-
try characteristics, we calculate the predicted probabilities of fully supporting redistribution
(i.e. responding in the highest possible category) for an average individual. Varying the effect
of religious polarization while holding all other factors constant, Figure 3 shows that polariza-
tion reduces the level of support from around nineteen to thirteen percent. Regarding welfare
state policies, more liberal welfare policies go hand in hand with lower levels of support
for redistribution, while conservative policies have the opposite effect. Both are comparable
in size to that of religious polarization, as shown in the last two panels of Figure 3 on the
following page. This clear-cut finding stands in contrast to the more mixed results of previ-
ous research (see Svallfors 2003) and strengthens the argument that operationalizing welfare
policies as continuous dimensions instead of regime dummies has clear analytical advantages.
Moreover, the finding that conservative welfare policy patterns increase citizen’s support for
redistribution, is in line with recent results by Meier-Jaeger (2009).
Estimates for established explanatory individual level factors largely show the expected direc-
tions and are stable across model specifications. Individuals with higher levels of education,
those who receive larger incomes, are self-employed or employed in a service class profes-
sion clearly oppose redistribution. On the other hand, those working in technical and routine
19‘Religious individuals’ means Catholics and Protestants combined. However, including the “other” category as
well does not change substantive results.
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Figure 3: Effects of country characteristics on probability of full support for redistribution holding
other factors constant. Predicted probabilities and 95% confidence bounds for an average individual.
manual occupations, as well as the currently unemployed are in support of it. Individuals who
are not part of the labor force (mainly students and people doing housework) show a clear
aversion against income redistribution, which was not expected given the “transfer classes”
argument. Finally, support for redistribution is also high among older individuals, those who
have children living in the household and women. The large gender effect is rather remark-
able given that we have already taken income and labor market position into account.
Conclusion
In this study we examined the effect of religion, both as denomination and participation, on
individual preferences for income redistribution through the state. Starting from a cleavage
based perspective that stresses the role of social identities for the formation of beliefs, atti-
tudes and preferences, we hypothesized that the historical church–state conflict over mode
and means of welfare provision will manifest itself in individual preferences. Individuals who
place themselves on the religious side of the religious–secular divide were expected to oppose
redistribution through governmental action. Employing Bayesian hierarchical ordered logit
models, we confirmed that Protestants and Catholics do indeed show substantial opposition
to income redistribution. The strength of this effect is comparable to a seizable increase in in-
come or education. This strong effect of denominational identification shows that motivations
beyond self-interest determine the extent to which citizens support or oppose redistributive
policies. Contrarily, the comparatively less relevant effect of church attendance underscores
the fact that an individual’s cleavage position and the associated set of ideas and values is the
most important driving force shaping preferences – and not the integration in religious groups
and the (in-) tangible benefits it might bring (as argued by economics of religion scholars).
Moreover, we argued that in modernized secular societies the main dividing line regarding
religion is no longer between Catholics and Protestants. Rather, we expected that individuals
are united in their opposition to secular policies and the type of society those (might) create,
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making the religious–secular divide the more important cleavage. This hypothesis was clearly
confirmed: we found a statistically reliable difference between the Catholic–Protestant cleav-
age on the one hand and the secular–religious division on the other and we confirmed that
the secular–religious cleavage is more important in shaping redistribution preferences.
On the contextual level we expected that, in addition to the effects of welfare state character-
istics, religious polarization decreases the overall support for redistribution. Using a refined
measure from the theoretical literature (Esteban and Ray 1994), our analysis reveals that a
country’s degree of religious polarization does indeed affect the preferences of its citizen’s:
increased antagonism between secular and religious groups leads to lower support for re-
distribution. Regarding welfare state characteristics, we went beyond the dominant ‘regime
dummy approach’ to measuring welfare policies. We found that more liberal welfare polices
also lead to opposition to redistribution, whereas traditional conservative policies increase the
level of support.
The results of this paper suggest, that religion is an important factor, that should not be
ignored in research on the causes and consequences of welfare states. We argue that that
the literature’s predominant focus on social class as a major cleavage in advanced industrial
societies underestimates the importance of religion as part of the “social bases of politics”
(Lipset 1983). In the process of secularization, large scale religious organizations may have
lost their power to influence policy making directly. However, religion continues to influence
individual’s attitudes and beliefs – which are not restricted to questions of ‘private morale’.
Rather, the religious–secular cleavage shapes individual’s political preferences in predicable
ways, rivaling the effect of more established factors.
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